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Terrorism in Eurasia: Enhancing the 
Multilateral Response 
Richard Weitz* 
The upcoming summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
provides a timely opportunity to enhance the international response to 
Eurasian terrorism.  China, Russia, the United States and their allies 
should establish mechanisms to integrate better the efforts of the main 
multilateral institutions concerned with preventing and responding to 
terrorism in Central Asia.  Many of their activities needlessly overlap, 
leading to wasted resources and potential conflicts.   
Responding to the threat of Eurasian terrorism requires a multilateral 
effort.  Terrorists regularly move from country to country, seeking safe 
havens wherever they can. Operatives of the region’s most prominent 
terrorist group, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), used 
Afghanistan and Pakistan as bases for launching forays into Central 
Asia.1 Efforts to establish multilateral institutions exclusively among the 
Central Asian countries have regularly encountered insurmountable 
intra-regional rivalries.  For this reason, the most successful cooperative 
initiatives thus far have involved at least one extra-regional great power. 
In the realm of antiterrorism, the most important multilateral 
institutions have been the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the 
Commonwealth of Independent States, the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, with the 
European Union and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe playing smaller roles.  
Eurasia’s Key Antiterrorist Institutions 
The title of the “Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, 
Separatism, and Extremism,” signed at the organization’s founding 
summit in June 2001, highlights the priorities of the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO). Its Regional Antiterrorism Structure 
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(RATS) in Tashkent officially began operations in June 2004. Its staff 
coordinates studies of regional terrorist movements, exchanges 
information about terrorist threats, and provides advice about 
counterterrorist policies. For several years, SCO members have 
undertaken numerous joint initiatives to combat narcotics trafficking and 
other organized crime, which has become a major source of terrorist 
financing.  After the May 2005 Uzbek military crackdown in Andijan, the 
SCO members pledged not to offer asylum to designated terrorists or 
extremists. 2  In early March 2006, Uzbekistan hosted a multilateral 
exercise, East-Antiterror-2006, under its auspices. 
After Vladimir Putin became Russian President, Moscow launched a 
sustained campaign to revitalize the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS) by enhancing cooperation among a core group of pro-
Russian governments.  Defending against transnational threats such as 
drug trafficking, arms smuggling, and especially terrorism soon became a 
CIS priority. For example, the members established a Counter-Terrorism 
Center in Bishkek that is compiling a list of terrorist and extremist 
organizations operating in its member states. In May 2001, the CIS 
members created a Collective Rapid Deployment Force (CRDF) to 
provide a collective response to terrorist attacks or incursions. It initially 
was not a standing force, but a formation of earmarked battalions based 
in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan.3 In August 2005, the 
CIS organized a major command staff exercise, “Anti-Terror 2005,” in 
western Kazakhstan. Representatives from most members participated, as 
did Iranian observers for the first time.4 
Russia’s efforts to enhance security cooperation among a core group 
of pro-Moscow governments culminated in the May 2002 decision by the 
presidents of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and 
Tajikistan to create a new Collective Security Treaty Organization 
(CSTO). Besides developing the capacity to mobilize large multinational 
military formations in the event of external aggression, the CSTO has 
taken charge of the CRDF, giving it a multinational staff and a mobile 
command center. CRDF units have engaged in several major antiterrorist 
exercises in Central Asia, including Rubezh-2004 (“Frontier 2004”) in 
August 2004, and Rubezh-2005 in April 2005, which involved 
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approximately 3,000 troops. 5   Countering narcotics trafficking and 
terrorism within Central Asia have become major CSTO objectives. 
Since 2003, the intelligence, law-enforcement, and defense agencies of the 
member states have jointly conducted annual “Kanal” (“Channel”) 
operations to intercept drug shipments from Afghanistan through the 
region’s porous borders.  Furthermore, the CSTO has established a 
working group on Afghanistan to strengthen that country’s law 
enforcement and counter-narcotics efforts. 
By taking charge of the International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) in Afghanistan in August 2003, NATO has also committed itself 
to promoting long-term security in Central Asia. In line with this 
enhanced role, alliance representatives have sought military transit 
agreements, secure lines of communications, and other supportive 
logistical arrangements from Central Asian governments.  At their late 
June 2004 Istanbul summit, the NATO heads of government affirmed 
the increased importance of Central Asia by designating it, along with 
the Caucasus, as an area of “special focus” in their communiqué. They 
also appointed a Secretary General Special Representative for the region 
and stationed a liaison officer there. The alliance has unsuccessfully 
pressed Central Asian governments to undertake both political and 
military reforms. After NATO’s North Atlantic Council curtailed 
cooperative programs with Uzbekistan following the Andijan crackdown, 
the Uzbek government responded by expelling almost all NATO forces 
from its territory. Despite the collapse of NATO-Uzbek security ties, the 
other Central Asian governments remain interested in cooperating with 
the alliance. For example, Kazakhstan recently negotiated an Individual 
Partnership Action Plan with NATO.  
The EU seeks to eliminate sources of terrorism in Eurasia by reducing 
poverty, environmental degradation, and illicit trafficking in narcotics, 
small arms, and people. Notwithstanding these goals, its substantive 
focus remains developing the region’s energy and transportation routes, 
expanding trade and investment, and promoting political, economic, and 
social reforms. The EU also devotes considerably more resources to other 
regions such as the Balkans and the South Caucasus. For 2006, the 
European Commission has allocated only 66 million euros to help all five 
Central Asian governments reduce poverty, expand regional cooperation, 
and support ongoing administrative, institutional, and legal reforms.6 
Another impediment to EU antiterrorist efforts in Eurasia is that the 
governments of Russia and Central Asia accuse EU officials of 
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employing “double standards” in approaching terrorist threats. For their 
part, EU governments have declined to share substantial terrorism-
related intelligence with Russian or Central Asian governments because 
they consider the level of data protection in Russia and Central Asia 
inadequate.7 
Like the EU, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) seeks to reduce political, economic, and social causes of 
terrorism. Such factors include unfair elections, unjustified restrictions 
on freedom of expression, and discrimination based on religion, ethnicity, 
or other improper considerations. Current OSCE projects in Central Asia 
include curbing illicit trafficking in drugs and small arms, strengthening 
the security of travel documents and border controls, and countering 
terrorist financing and other transnational criminal activities.  The 
OSCE Special Police Matters Unit seeks to bolster Central Asian 
countries’ ability to counter terrorism and other illegal activities.  Its 
Forum for Security Cooperation has encouraged members to adopt 
stricter export controls on small arms, light weapons, and Man Portable 
Air Defense Systems (MANPADS), all of which could facilitate terrorist 
attacks. In recent years, Russia and the Central Asian governments have 
complained that the OSCE has become excessively preoccupied with 
democracy and human rights while neglecting their security and 
development needs.  Resource limitations also constrain the OSCE’s 
influence in Central Asia. The organization allocates far more funds and 
personnel to its field missions in southeastern Europe than to Central 
Asia.8   
Restructuring the Multilateral Response 
The above survey makes clear the many overlapping multilateral 
antiterrorist activities in Central Asia. To reduce redundancies and 
exploit potential synergies, the leaders of these institutions and their 
member governments should deepen the dialogue and ties among them. 
The most urgent need is to connect NATO with the SCO and the CSTO, 
since the United States, China, and Russia are the most important non-
regional countries active in Central Asia, and the most significant 
members of these institutions. In addition, Russia (which belongs to both 
organizations) and China have already taken steps to enhance 
cooperation between the SCO and the CSTO directly. 
This month’s SCO summit would provide a convenient occasion for 
strengthening ties between the SCO and NATO.  Russia and China 
would probably prevent NATO governments from obtaining formal 
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SCO observer status, while the North Atlantic countries’ physical 
distance from Eurasia makes full membership impractical.  In November 
2002, however, the SCO Council of Foreign Ministers adopted a 
mechanism whereby it could invite “guests” to attend its meetings. 9 
Alternatively, Western officials might induce the individual hosts of 
SCO meetings to invite NATO observers directly to those sessions. At 
the July 2005 summit in Astana, then SCO chairman and host, Kazakh 
President Nursultan Nazarbayev, established this precedent by inviting 
senior officials from India, Iran, and Pakistan to participate as “guests of 
the chairman.” 10  Although these countries obtained formal observer 
status at the summit, Afghan representatives have attended several SCO 
meetings without receiving or requiring such status. Finally, NATO 
governments could seek to become a “partner” of specific SCO organs, 
such as the RATS. 
Another institutional relationship that requires further development 
is that between the CSTO and NATO. Since late 2003, CSTO officials, 
strongly supported by the Russian government, have advocated 
cooperating directly with NATO against terrorism and narcotics 
trafficking.11 In December 2004, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov 
noted that CSTO Secretary General Nikolai Bordyuzha had submitted 
an official proposal to NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer 
to establish formal contacts between the two organizations, especially in 
the counter-narcotics field.12 At the February 2006 international security 
conference in Munich, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said that 
NATO and the CSTO should join forces to combat terrorism and 
reconstruct Afghanistan. 13  NATO governments should consider such 
offers more seriously now that their position in Central Asia and 
Afghanistan has become more precarious. 
Working together to strengthen security along the Tajik-Afghan 
border could provide an optimal locale for multi-institutional 
collaboration since the three organizations’ zones of interest overlap there. 
The CSTO has established a special contact group with Afghanistan, and 
the SCO has invited Afghan delegations to several of its meetings. For its 
part, NATO enjoys overflight rights over Tajikistan in support of its 
operations in Afghanistan and provides technical assistance to Tajik 
border guards.  The members of all three institutions have been especially 
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concerned by the transit of Afghan heroin through Tajikistan to Russian 
and European markets.  In December 2005, the NATO-Russia Council 
(NRC) launched an initiative to improve counter-narcotics training in 
Afghanistan and Central Asia.14  NATO’s participation in the CRDF’s 
annual “Kanal” drug interception operations could expand such 
cooperation in a limited but mutually profitable manner. 
A more ambitious idea would be to establish an overarching 
coordination mechanism for the region’s major antiterrorist institutions. 
In mid-December 2005, CSTO General Director Toktasyn Buzubayev 
said the CSTO favored creating a Eurasian Advisory Council that could 
include representatives from the CSTO, the SCO, NATO, the EU, and 
the Eurasian Economic Community (which includes Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan).15 At a minimum, such a body could 
help de-conflict multilateral antiterrorist activities in Central Asia.  A 
coordination council would also allow representatives from the various 
institutions to meet periodically to exchange ideas and explore possible 
collaborative projects. 
Some might argue that the SCO desires less to cooperate with NATO 
in Central Asia than to displace it from the region. Not only are NATO 
and the SCO potential geopolitical rivals, but their members appear to 
have different understandings regarding what constitutes terrorists acts 
and who commits them. For example, American and European officials 
have criticized Russia, China, and Central Asia for employing overly 
broad definitions of terrorism in Chechnya, Xinjiang, and Andijan.  
Some fear these governments will justify suppressing their nonviolent 
political opponents by denouncing them as terrorists, bolstering terrorist 
recruitment in the process.  For their part, the SCO members have 
complained that NATO governments are pursuing ineffectual 
antiterrorist and counternarcotics policies in Afghanistan.  At their July 
2005 Astana summit, the SCO heads of state asked the Operation 
Enduring Freedom coalition to establish a deadline for withdrawing from 
their military bases in Central Asia since they no longer appeared to be 
waging a vigorous antiterrorist military operation in Afghanistan.   
Despite the unanimous adoption of the Astana resolution, the SCO 
appears divided over the desirability of a continued NATO military 
presence in the region. Some participants (e.g., Uzbekistan) clearly 
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wanted to end the now unwelcome Western military presence. Some 
(e.g., Russia and China) might have sought to reaffirm their expectation 
that NATO would eventually reduce its regional military footprint.  
Others (e.g., Kyrgyzstan) might have hoped to leverage the statement to 
extract greater basing rents. Finally, some signatories might have wanted 
simply to express their disapproval of certain Western policies. For 
example, they might have sought to galvanize NATO into heeding their 
complaints about the terrorist and narcotics threats from neighboring 
Afghanistan. Since only Uzbekistan eventually proceeded to expel 
NATO forces, most SCO leaders apparently realized upon reflection that 
a major Western military withdrawal from Central Asia would 
substantially worsen their security given the inability of any other 
country or institution to fill the resulting vacuum. 
The ambivalence among SCO members regarding the continuing 
military presence in Central Asia suggests that a NATO offer to 
establish direct ties might enjoy success. The SCO Executive Secretary, 
Zhang Deguang, said in early June 2006 that although his organization 
lacks contacts with NATO, “we are open for cooperation.”16 Russia could 
play a pivotal role here in framing a package deal.  Since Russian officials 
have led the drive to develop ties between NATO and the CSTO, they 
might induce reluctant SCO members to open a formal dialogue with 
NATO if Western governments reciprocated in the case of the CSTO. A 
more elegant solution would be to establish an overarching framework 
that would integrate all three institutions. Although such architectural 
restructuring will not be easy, effectively countering terrorist threats in 
Eurasia requires better coordinating multilateral efforts in this area. 
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